Most RAID controllers implemented in industry are complicated and di cult to reason about. This complexity has led to software and hardware systems that are di cult to debug and hard t o m o dify. To overcome this problem Courtright and Gibson have developed a rapid prototyping framework for RAID architectures which relies on a generic controller algorithm 1 . The designer of a new architecture n e eds to specify parts of the generic controller algorithm and must justify the validity of the controller algorithm obtained. However the latter task may be di cult due to the concurrency of operations on the disks. This is the reason why it would be useful to provide designers with an automated veri cation tool tailored s p eci cally for the RAID prototyping system.
Introduction
Most RAID controllers implemented in industry are complicated and di cult to reason about. This complexity has led to software and hardware systems that are di cult to debug and hard to extend. To o vercome this problem Courtright and Gibson have developed a rapid prototyping framework for RAID architectures This work was supported by D ARPA contracts F19628-95-C-0118 and F30602-97-2-0031, and AFOSR contract F49620-97- 1-0337. which relies on a generic controller algorithm 1 . The designer of a new architecture needs to specify parts of the generic controller algorithm and must justify the validity of the controller algorithm obtained. However the latter task may be di cult due to the concurrency of operations on the disks. This is the reason why it would be useful to provide designers with an automated veri cation tool tailored speci cally for the RAID prototyping system.
As a rst step towards building such a tool, our approach consists of studying several controller algorithms manually, to determine the key properties that need to be veri ed.
This paper presents the correctness of a controller algorithm 5 for the RAID Level 5 system. We c hose this architecture because of its popularity, a s w ell as for its relative simplicity.
Our method consists of modeling the controller formally, giving an external requirements speci cation and proving that the model satis es its speci cation.
Our study results in a key invariant for the controller that can be generalized for other architectures. We use this invariant to nd an error in a RAID Level 6 controller 5 .
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives background on RAID systems. Section 3 presents the RAID Level 5 system informally. Section 4 gives conventions used throughout the paper. Section 5 describes the speci cation and Section 6 our model of RAID Level 5. Section 7 presents the proof of correctness and Section 8 the extension of our work to the study of RAID Level 6, as well as the error found. Finally, Section 9 is a summary of our conclusions and future work.
RAID Systems
RAID or Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive Disks were developed in the 1980's to address the need for secondary storage systems with higher performance 9 .
A RAID system is composed of a disk array, and a disk array controller. The controller's function is to receive an operation from the user of the disk array, and to carry it out by performing a set of low-level operations or low-level op on speci c disks.
When the number of disks increases in a disk array, the availability of data and the reliability of the disk array m a y decrease dramatically 4 . We consider independent catastrophic disk failures, i.e., disk failures in which all data stored on the disk becomes inaccessible and the disk cannot be written any further. RAID systems are designed to be fault-tolerant b y storing redundant data 3 on extra disks and to tolerate 1 or 2 disk failures. The redundancy can be an identical copy of each disk, also known as disk mirroring, or it can involve h a ving a parity disk 9 , for n disks containing data. The parity disk contains blocks, called parity blocks, that cover groups of n blocks independently stored. A set of n blocks along with the parity block that covers them is called a parity group. The parity block is computed by performing a bit-wise XOR on the blocks it covers. Given any set of n blocks, the n + 1st block can be recovered by performing an XOR on the n blocks.
There are several RAID architectures that are classi ed into ve levels" 9 . Di erent RAID architectures can be distinguished based on their type of encoding, mapping and algorithms used to access data. The encoding indicates the type of redundancy information used, and the mapping the placement of data and redundant information on the disk array.
Algorithms used to access data can be classi ed as normal-mode and failed-mode ones. In normal-mode, the controller knows about failed disks, if any, and operates on the disk array with this knowledge. In failed-mode, a disk failure has occurred in the middle of controller operation. The controller then needs to recover from the error and complete the operation. This process is called error recovery.
Most RAID architectures use forward error recovery. This scheme consists of transitioning from a state in which an error has occurred in the middle of controller operation directly to completion. This method involves enumerating a large number of erroneous states. Furthermore it results in architecture-speci c controller algorithms, making extension to new architectures di cult.
To o vercome this problem, Courtright and Gibson propose a form of backward error-recovery method 1 , based on retry 1 . When an error is encountered, the state of the system is modi ed to note which disk has failed, and the operation is retried based on the new state.
In this approach, operations are represented as Directed Acyclic Graphs DAGs. Each n o d e i n a D AG is a low-level op to be performed on a disk or a lowlevel op that computes data.
Courtright and Gibson's method of error recovery 1 has two requirements. First, each l o w-level op must be idempotent, which ensures that a low-level op that is executed several times has the same e ect as if it is executed only once. Secondly, the execution of DAGs must leave the array i n a consistent state, that is the redundant information must be correct.
Due to the concurrency of low-level ops and the existence of failures, reasoning about the correctness of an algorithm using Courtright and Gibson's error recovery method may be di cult. This task would be easier if an automated veri cation tool were provided.
As a rst step towards building such a tool, our approach consists of studying several controller algorithms manually. This paper studies the correctness of a controller algorithm 1 for the RAID Level 5 system 5 , that uses Courtright and Gibson's error recovery method. We c hose this architecture because of its popularity, a s w ell as for its relative simplicity.
We model the algorithm using I O automata 7 , and give an external requirements speci cation. We then prove that the model implements its speci cation, in the sense that there exists a simulation relation 7 from the model to its speci cation.
3 Informal Description of the RAID Level 5 System RAID Level 5 5 uses parity and can tolerate one disk failure. In this architecture, data is blockinterleaved and parity blocks are distributed among all the disks in the array. A parity block is the bitwise XOR of all the blocks it covers. We assume that there are n + 1 disks in the array.
The controller receives read and write operations from the environment sequentially. Note that each operation requires low-level reads and writes to be performed concurrently on the disks. For each operation it gures out where the data to be read written is located in the array, and what parity groups are concerned. For each parity group, the controller chooses an algorithm for carrying out the operation and starts executing it. If a disk needed in an algorithm fails 1 Courtright has since moved on to a similar but di erent error recovery method called roll-away error recovery 2 while the algorithm is running, then the controller stops the execution of that algorithm and chooses another one to complete the operation. The controller assumes at most one failure.
Disk array algorithms are represented as Directed Acyclic Graphs DAGs. Each n o d e i n a D AG represents a disk read or write or an XOR. All the low-level ops of a single DAG refer to a unique parity group and represent reads and writes to disk sectors. In a read DAG, we denote the indices of disks to be read by i 0 to i m,1 in an arbitrary order, where m is an integer such that 0 m n. Similarly, in a write DAG, we denote the indices of disks to be written by i 0 to i m,1 . In this case, i m to i n,1 represent indices of disks not to be written. We denote the index of the failed disk by f. In the DAGs, the notation RD i means read disk with index i similarly for WR i. DAGs and the criteria for choosing them are described below.
DAGs and DAG selection Figures 1 through 6 present the DAGs. Note that these are informal and do not contain information about how to compute parity blocks. We do not give formal semantics for these DAGs. An arrow from node A to node B indicates that node A must be performed before node B. Low-level ops are atomic. Moreover, if a low-level op fails because of a disk failure, then the DAG stops executing and the controller chooses another DAG to complete the operation.
Fault Free Read DAG1, Figure 1 The FaultFree Read DAG is used when there is no failure among the disks to be read. It consists of reading disks con- Degraded Read DAG2, Figure 2 The Degraded Read DAG is used when one of the disks to be read has failed. It consists of reading the entire array, except the failed disk, and reconstructing the missing data, by taking the bit-wise XOR of the data read.
Small Write DAG3, Figure 3 The Small Write DAG is used in the absence of failures, when less than half of the array is to be written. In the presence of a failure in a disk that is not to be written, the Small Write is also used regardless of the number of disks to be written. It consists of reading the old data on the disks to be written and the parity, computing the new parity and writing the new parity and the new data. The new parity is the bit-wise XOR of the old data, the new data and the old parity.
Large Write, absence of failure DAG4, Figure 4 DAG4 is chosen when there are no failures and more than half of the array i s to be written. DAG4 consists of reading the data from the disks that are not to be written, computing the parity from the data read and the data to be written and writing the new parity and data. In DAG4, there is an antecedence from each read to each write. Without these antecedences, there exists an execution of the DAG that leaves the disk array i n an inconsistent state and no DAG can restore consistency. For example, assume that these antecedences were not there. DAG4 may start by writing a disk, and a disk not to be written fails. In this case, the parity group being modi ed cannot be restored to a consistent state, because a disk has failed, another one has been modi ed and the parity contains Large Write, failure in disk to be written DAG5, Figure 5 In the presence of a failure in a disk that is to be written, DAG5 is used regardless of the number of disks to be written. DAG5 is identical to DAG4 except that the failed disk is not written.
Large Write, failure in parity disk DAG6, Figure 6 DAG6 is used when the parity disk has failed. It consists of writing the disks to be written directly.
Conventions
In this section, we introduce the notation we use throughout the paper. We use the type V = f0,1g
to denote values of bits read or written. The symbol ? denotes the unde ned value, and ? + denotes a marked version of the unde ned value. The usage of the latter will become apparent when we i n troduce the models. The type V + denotes V f ? + g. We dene the ordering relation on V + f?g as follows: v v 0 , v = v 0 _ v 2 f ? ; ? + ĝ v 0 2 f 0; 1g.
We next de ne types needed for the indices of disks.
We use I to denote the set f0, ..., n,1g and I n the set I f ng. B is the set of all subsets of I, and B n the set of all subsets of I n . We de ne the following operators, for B 2 B , B co = I , B and B n = B f ng. We use the notation B co n to denote B co n . We use the shortcut notation B=jto denote B=fjg where = denotes set di erence, for B 2 B n and j 2 I n f noneg. In this notation, j intuitively represents a disk that has failed. The value none represents no failure. So B=j intuitively means all indices in B except the one that has failed, if any.
Finally, P is the set of all partial functions from I to V + . Likewise, P n is the set of all partial functions from I n to V + . We use the symbol? to represent the unde ned value for a partial function. P 0 of type P is such that 8i 2 I , P 0 i = ?. Similarly, P n0 of type P n is such that 8i 2 I n , P n0 i = ?.
We also de ne the following functions.
For P 2 P n , indicesP = fi j P i 2 V g , and L P = L i2indicesP P i if indicesP 6 = ;, 0 otherwise.
We also introduce the following shortcuts for the code in our models. For P 2 P n , B 2 B n and v 2 V + , PB : = v is equivalent to the following piece of code:
for all i 2 B do P i : = v od. For P 2 P n , Q 2 P , P := Q is equivalent to the following piece of code:
for all i 2 I do P i : = Q i od; P n : = ?
5 Speci cation
In this section, we describe the speci cation, Spec, for the system using I O Automata 7 . Spec makes the assumption that there are n bits, indexed from 0 to n , 1 that can be read or written. It captures the property that the value returned on a read from a bit corresponds to the last write to that bit, or an arbitrary value if no write has been performed. It interacts with an environment automaton Env, which requests one operation at a time. We use Spec 0 to denote the composition of Spec with Env. Thus the inputs in Spec 0 happen one at a time, and each input is submitted until after the previous one has been processed. Figure 7 presents the model for the speci cation. Underlined variables and statements are not part of the basic model. These variables are history variables and will be introduced below. The model has the external interface shown in Figure 7 .
Spec has the following state variables. Bit is an array o f n bits, indexed from 0 to n , 1, initially arbitrary. WritePairs has no more values to be written, the automaton performs a WriteOK output, which sets pc back t o idle.
We add the following history variables to Spec. The modi ed automaton is shown in Figure 7 6 Model for the RAID Level 5 System In this section, we give our model for the RAID Level 5 System. The model makes the following assumptions. First, the controller uses the same set of DAGs on every parity group and two DAGs on different parity groups do not interfere with each other's execution. Therefore it is su cient t o s h o w that the controller's behavior is correct on one parity group. Thus the model assumes a single parity group consisting of n + 1 disks, indexed from 0 to n, where disk n is the parity disk. Secondly, all parity computations are bit-wise. Therefore the model assumes one bit per disk, and this restriction can be removed trivially. Finally, the model assumes at most one disk failure.
We present the RAID Level 5 model in Figures 8  and 9 , and refer to this model as RAID. In the gures, underlined variables and statements are not part of the basic model. These variables are history variables and will be introduced below.
The external interface of RAID is the same as the one for Spec. RAID interacts with the same environment Env as Spec. Env requests one operation at a time. We use RAID 0 to denote the composition of Env and Spec.
RAID has the following state variables. Disk is an array o f n+1 bits, indexed from 0 to n. This variable models a single parity group in a physical RAID sys- be read. WritePairs is of type P n , initially P n0 . It is used to remembervalues that are to be written to Disk and that have not been written yet. WritePairsPerm is of type P, initially P 0 . It is used to remember the values that are to be written to disks other than the parity, for the duration of a write operation. DAG ranges over fnone,chooseR,chooseW,1,2,3,4,5,6g and indicates which D AG is currently running or whether a DAG is to be chosen. It is set to none when the automaton is idle, which is also its initial value. f is of type I n f noneg and indicates which disk has failed.
If it is equal to none, then no disk has failed. A failed disk cannot be read or written any further. This models the catastrophic failure of disks. f is initially none. We de ne the following derived variables for RAID, which are used in the statement of properties in subsequent sections: All= I n =f, and StartedWriting, is a boolean equivalent t o 9i 2 Indices, WritePairs i 6 = WritePairsPerm i . RAID does not represent DAGs explicitly. DAG nodes are represented by the actions readi, write3i,v, write45i,v and write6i,v. DAG precedences are represented in the preconditions of lowlevel writes. DAG selection is done using actions chooseDAG1, through chooseDAG6. Note that XOR nodes in the DAGs are not present in the model as separate actions, the XORs are computed in the preconditions of low-level writes to Disk n .
We now explain how RAID works. When RAID receives a ReadB input, it records which indices are to be read in the variable Indices. It also sets ReadPairs i , for i 2 B, to ? + . The symbol ? + is used as a placeholder. The values read from the disk array will be placed into this state variable and ? + will be replaced with values read. When RAID receives a WriteP input, it records which indices are to be written along with corresponding values in variable WritePairs.
After receiving an input, RAID proceeds to choosing a DAG to execute. The selection criteria appear in the precondition of each chooseDAG action, and is the same as what we described in Section 3.
chooseDAG actions may change ReadPairs by putting placeholders for indices to be read. They may also change WritePairs n t o ? + , which signi es that Disk n needs to be written. When Disk n is actually written, then WritePairs n is set back t o ?. on Disk i that needs to be executed. In that case, the action stops the execution of the current D AG b y changing DAG to either chooseR or chooseW, which causes a new DAG t o b e c hosen using the same rules as before. Otherwise, DAG remains unchanged. Finally, we add the following history variables to RAID. The changes are shown in Figures 8 and 9 by underlining. The rst one is VD of type V, which stands for Virtual Disk and is initially 0. It is used to keep the last value written to a disk, except the parity disk, if it has failed. VD is updated as indicated in the gure. The second one is Rec, which is a boolean, initially false. It is true when a DAG has stopped execution because of a failure and a second DAG is running to complete the operation. Rec is updated by faili, ReadBackP and WriteOK.
Proof of Correctness
This section presents the proof of correctness. We show that RAID 0 implements Spec 0 , by showing that there exists a simulation relation 7 from RAID 0 to Spec 0 . Section 7.1 presents the key invariant called consistency. Section 7.2 gives the simulation relation to be proved. Section 7.3 gives the step correspondence of the proof. The complete formal proof of the simulation relation is not presented here and appears in 10 .
Consistency
In this section, we present the consistency property. A proof of this Lemma appears in 10 . Informally, a parity group with no failure is consistent, if the XOR of all bits is equal to 0. If there is a failure at a disk other that the parity disk, then the XOR of all bits, except the one that has failed, is equal to the last Lemma 7.1 consists of two parts. The rst part expresses under what conditions the parity group is consistent. These conditions are: when the controller is idle or doing a read operation, when the controller is about to choose a write DAG and the failed disk, if any, is not among the disks to be written, and when DAG4 is executing and it has not started writing. This last condition is true because of the dependencies in DAG4 that force all the writes to occur after all the reads.
When the controller is executing a write DAG and it has started writing, the parity group is no longer consistent. The second part of Lemma 7.1 expresses an invariant relevant to the execution of write DAGs 3,4,5 that is needed to restore the parity group to a consistent state when the write operation is done. Note that the parity group is trivially consistent after the execution of DAG6, since f = n in that case.
The second property expresses the fact that during the execution of a write DAG, the XOR of the disks read, the disks to be read, and the disks not to be written except for the failed one, is equal to VD if there is no failure among disks to be written, and 0 otherwise. The second property is a technical invariant needed to prove the rst.
Simulation Relation
In this section, we give a relation between states of RAID 0 and Spec 0 . We need to show that this relation is a simulation relation. Let s and u be states of RAID 0 and Spec 0 respectively, and f the following relation. Let the corresponding execution fragment be none. In this case, the value read by is not directly returned to Env. These reads are performed to compute parity or the value of a lost data being read.
If s.DAG = 1 _ s.DAG = 2 i 2 s:Indices. In this case, the value read by needs to be returned directly to Env. Thus Spec 0 needs to perform a readi. However it could be that RAID 0 is running a second DAG for the current operation and that a readi has already been performed, in which case Spec 0 has also already performed a readi. In this case, u.ReadPairs i 2 V , and the corresponding execution fragment i s none. Otherwise it is u,readi,u 0 .
2 f write3i,v,write45i,v,write6i,vg, where i 6 = n. Spec 0 also needs to perform writei,v.
However it could be that RAID 0 is running a second DAG for the current operation and that has already been performed, in which case Spec 0 has also already performed a writei,v. properties are used. Consistency is used to give the step correspondence for ReadBackP , in the case where there is a failure among disks to be read. Idempotency of read write low-level ops is used for the step correspondence of readi writei,v, in the case where RAID 0 is running a second DAG to complete an operation and this low-level op has been performed once before.
Extension
We n o w turn our attention to a controller algorithm for the RAID Level 6 architecture 5 . We generalize part of the main invariant, consistency, and use it to nd an error in a RAID Leve l 6 D AG.
RAID Level 6
RAID Level 6 uses two parity blocks for each group of n blocks stored on separate disks. It can tolerate two disk failures. One parity block n 1 is computed by taking the XOR of all data blocks. The other parity n 2 is computed using Reed-Solomon codes.
RAID Level 6 uses Courtright and Gibson's error recovery method analogously to RAID Level 5. It has DAGs that are similar. In particular the Small Write DAG is shown in Figure 10 . The symbol Q indicates the computation of n 2 .
Error found
We use a generalized version of part of the consistency Lemma to nd an error in the Small Write DAG, without performing the entire proof of correctness for RAID Level 6. Consider the following part of the consistency Lemma Invariant 1: In all reachable states of RAID 0 , i f n 6 = f and DAG = chooseW^f 6 2 Indices, then L i2All Disk i = VD.
Consider the case in which there is a failure in a disk not to be written. Intuitively, this invariant s a ys that if the controller is about to choose a write DAG, then the value implied by the system for the failed disk L i2All Disk i is equal to the value of the last write to that disk VD.
Consequently, for this invariant to be true, it must be that if a write DAG fails in such a w ay that there is a failure among the disks not to be written, then the value implied by the system for the failed disk is equal to the value last written to it. In other words, the failure of a write DAG should not cause the loss of data in disks not to be written.
We use this idea to nd an error in the DAG presented above. Consider a scenario in which, RD i 0 and WR i 0 are performed, then disk indexed i m not to be written fails. This does not cause the DAG to stop. But suppose disk i 1 then failed as well. In this case, the DAG stops and a new DAG needs to be chosen to complete the operation. However the value of disk i m has been lost, because the array has been partially updated. In addition, when a DAG fails the state is reset and thus it is impossible to recover the value of the failed disk.
Summary and Future Work
In this paper, we used I O Automata to model and verify a controller algorithm for the RAID Level 5 system, which uses Courtright and Gibson's error recovery method. By performing this case study, we formalized a key invariant, consistency, which helped in nding an error in a di erent more complicated RAID controller algorithm.
This project started out by a preliminary study using the model checker SMV 8 . We modeled the DAGs for RAID Level 5 separately and used the tool to show that the DAGs preserve consistency. However it became clear that our notion of consistency was not accurate and that we needed to formalize this property. This led us to the study of the controller algorithm as a whole.
With the formalization of the consistency invariant we can envisage a tool that takes a model of a controller algorithm based on Courtright and Gibson's error recovery, and checks that consistency is preserved in all reachable states. Such a tool can be built based on a model checker.
The advantage of such a tool is that it would be speci cally tailored to Courtright and Gibson's prototyping system. Its users will not need to know about the formalization of the consistency property and will not need to reproduce the hand-proof present in this case study. However hand-proofs are essential at this stage of the design of the tool, because they allow u s t o determine the exact expression of properties to verify.
Courtright credits our work in his PhD thesis 2 as playing a role in debugging his designs and he encourages continued work in this direction, especially in collaboration with industry partners.
Future work consists of proving correctness of other RAID controllers using Courtright and Gibson's error recovery, a s w ell as considering controller algorithms that use Courtright's latest error recovery method 2 . Finally, w e plan to build a special-purpose veri cation tool.
